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Durrand
Glacier Avalanche--The BC Coroner's Report
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November 3, 2003--The British Columbia Coroner's
Service has released its Judgement of Inquiry report regarding
events surrounding the tragic avalanche at Selkirk Mountain Experience
last January 20th. The avalanche buried thirteen people, killing
seven, four Canadians and three Americans. A total of 21 skiers
were divided into two groups, one climbing directly above the
other in Tumbledown Mountain's La Traviata Couloir when the avalanche
struck. While the Coroner's report is sure to draw fire (in fact
we have received information indicating that there are a number
of factual errors, we will have to return to that at another
time), its details confirm many points made by those who have
been critical of the decisions made that day on the Durrand Glacier. |
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Among the key findings
(emphasis added):
- The La Traviata West Couloir
"is strongly affected by wind and showed signs of the snow
cover being affected by southeast winds this year and in photos
from previous years...(the couloir) that the group was ascending
is a broad shallow wind scoured gully with a lee feature on the
southeast side. It has an average slope of 35 degrees and
a maximum angle of 37 degrees."
- "The whole area drains
onto a flat bench with some old moraine features. Below the west
couloir the moraine features created a shallow depression. This
depression acted as a terrain trap, causing the avalanche
to stop very quickly and for the deposit to pile up in the depression
rather than fan out. This, plus the size and speed of the avalanche,
caused the victims to be buried very deeply in hard packed snow."
- "The guests were
told to spread out about five feet apart. "
- "..climatic events
mid to late November 2002 created a weak layer in the snow pack
that remained throughout the winter. This November rain crust
layer was general and widespread throughout British Columbia
and was seen as a serious threat throughout the ski industry."
- "The Canadian Avalanche
Association issued a Public Avalanche Bulletin on January 17,
2003..the travel advisory read: 'It is important to remember
that this El Nino year is producing a complex and unusual snow
pack for the mountains of BC. Be alert for remote triggering
and continue to be vigilant about avoiding those tempting big
steep alpine faces. Any avalanche triggered on the older weaknesses
may propagate extensively into a large and dangerous avalanche
event.' "
- "On January 21, 2003,
(investigator) STANIER went to the site of the avalanche and
conducted his on site investigation. .. At the high point of
the group's up track he found a very weak, shallow snow pack
in (a) rocky wind scoured area. This high point was very different
from the mostly strong deep snow pack found in the gully that
the group was ascending. The November rain crust was found throughout
the shallow area fairly near to the surface due to wind scouring.
It is clear that the weight of the first skiers triggered
the failure here where there was no sufficient bridging strength
in the snow pack to isolate them from this layer. "
- "The first avalanche
was a class 3... This avalanche crossed the group’s track
from earlier in the day...A second, small class 1 avalanche then
released .. on the rounded ridge between the first avalanche
and the group’s ascent route. The main fatal avalanche then
released on the group's ascent route. It is not possible to know
exactly what the mechanism was that caused the second and third
avalanches to release in this case. They either released sympathetically
by the vibration of the first avalanche, or the failure propagated
around the lower slope. The rain crust did connect all these
features so that is a possibility.
- "The fracture line
of the fatal avalanche was at 2510 m on a 33 degree southwest-facing
slope (editor's note: this would appear to be a possible mistake
in the report, given the earlier description of the slope)..The
area is wind scoured with a lee feature on the southeast
end... The fracture showed clearly that the shear failure
was on the November rain crust and there was no evidence
that the failure stepped down from any upper layers. "
Finally, in (for its implications)
what is perhaps the most tragic finding in the report:
- "Profiles taken at
the avalanche fracture line where the group’s track crossed
it show a very strong well-settled snow pack above the November
crust. Profiles taken near the rocks at the NW end of the fracture
are much more similar to the profiles taken in the shallow wind
affected areas near where the group triggered the original avalanche...Probing
around the area above the fracture line showed a gradual decrease
in depth and strength as the slope becomes lower angle and wind
exposed near where the avalanche was triggered. The November
rain crust was felt in all locations while probing where the
snow depth was over 40 cm and in all the snow profiles."
Put bluntly, the Coroner's
shows that there was a known and widespread instability in the
area due to a well-noted rain crust from November. The two groups,
with members of each group closely spaced together, climbed a
steep, prime avalanche angle (and obviously wind loaded) slope,
with a deadly terrain trap lying below. The upper group triggered
an avalanche that released on the November rain crust connecting
all of the terrain features in the area. The rain crust would
have been relatively easy to detect though probing or pitting
to the ground. These are many of the key points made from the
start by those who have been most critical of the approach to
the tour taken that fateful day at Selkirk Mountain Experience.
Nevertheless, at least
some friends and family of the victims are not completely comfortable
with the report, its tone and its conclusions . Annie Polucha,
sister of victim Kathie Polucha Kessler says she wishes that
authorities in Canada had been more forthcoming in addressing
the issues of the decisions made by the SME guides last January
20th. Polucha has also said she wonders if there might be some
bias in the Coroner's Judgement of Inquiry. "Just three
paragraphs into the report SME is called 'world renowned,' I
read that and wondered 'what is that doing in here?," says
Annie. "When you read a comment like that it in an official
report that is supposed to be unbiased, well, it makes you wonder."
The BC Coroner's
Judgement of Inquiry Report
(Editor's note:
this report would appear to be one of several prepared for each
of the deceased, in this case the victim was Vern Lunsford, 49,
an aerospace engineer from Littleton, Colorado)
Ministry of Public Safety
and Solicitor General
BC Coroners Service
Judgement of Inquiry
Into the Death of
LUNSFORD JR., RALPH VERNON |
Case No: 2003:528:0002 Police
File: 2003-0158 Police Department: Revelstoke RCMP |
SUMMARY OF EVENTS:
On January 20, 2003, at
approximately 1120 hours, the Revelstoke RCMP Detachment was
advised that there had been an avalanche in the area of the Durrand
glacier, approximately 25 kilometers north of Revelstoke British
Columbia and that there were numerous burials and loss of life.
Search and rescue efforts had been underway since 1045 hours
and Emergency Health Services had personnel on site. Two RCMP
constables were sent to the scene. Weather was problematic and
became a factor in the outside rescue effort. Fog in the area
made it difficult to fly to the incident site. When outside help
arrived the rescue effort was almost complete.
Those involved in the avalanche
were guides, staff and clients of Selkirk Mountain Experience,
a privately owned hut operation specializing in ski touring.
21 people had been ascending a run called La Traviata West Couloir
(Couloir- a deep gorge or gully on a mountain side) when they
triggered an avalanche. 13 people were involved in the avalanche,
7 died of asphyxiation before they could be rescued.
INVESTIGATIVE FINDINGS:
Selkirk Mountain Experience
is a world renowned hut based wilderness ski touring lodge located
in the Selkirk Mountain range a short distance north of Revelstoke
British Columbia in an area known as the Durrand Glacier. The
company caters to experienced clientele who want a demanding
and physically challenging skiing experience. It is accessible
only by helicopter. Clients are flown in Saturday mornings and
spend a week at the lodge. The morning of the first day is spent
learning about and practicing the use of Pieps (transceivers)
and Probes and site orientation. The afternoon usually involves
ski touring on nearby runs.
Ralph Vernon ‘Vern’
LUNSFORD JR, age 49 years, of Littleton, Colorado, U.S.A. arrived
at the lodge on Saturday, January 18, 2003 along with 19 other
guests. On Monday, January 20, he was among 21 skiers intending
to spend the day ski touring. They were divided into two groups
and intended to ski together for the day. The leader of the first
group was the owner of Selkirk Mountain Experience. He is a UIAGM
certified guide (UIAGM is French- the English equivalent is IFMGA-
International Federation of Mountain Guides Association). The
assistant guide, a certified alpine climbing guide and certified
assistant ski guide, led the second group. Both the lead guide
and assistant guide were operating within the guidelines set
out by the ACMG (Association of Canadian Mountain Guides) Terrain
Guidelines They departed the Selkirk Mountain Experience lodge
at approximately 0800 hours, intending to ski Fronalp Peak and
later in the day La Traviata West Couloir. When they arrived
in the area of Tumbledown Mountain they could see heavy fog sitting
on Fronalp Peak. The lead guide decided to ski La Traviata first.
The change in plan was communicated by radio to the assistant
guide who was leading the second group a short distance behind.
It was decided that both groups would ski La Traviata.
An avalanche investigation
report, commissioned by the British Columbia Coroners Service,
was prepared by Mr. Larry STANIER of Canmore Alberta. His report
has been quoted extensively throughout this Judgement of Inquiry.
La Traviata is found on
the National Topographic System 1:50,000 82M/8 Downie Creek.
UTM coordinates are east 294 and north 823.
Mr. STANIER describes La
Traviata West Couloir as an open alpine, southwest facing slope
approximately 180 metres high, bounded by cliffs to the west
and steeper terrain to the east. It is on the south face of the
west Ridge of Tumbledown Mountain. It is strongly affected by
wind and showed signs of the snow cover being affected by southeast
winds this year and in photos from previous years. Most of the
surrounding terrain is very rocky. The La Traviata West Couloir
that the group was ascending is a broad, shallow, wind scoured
gully with a lee feature on the southeast side. It has an average
slope of 35 degrees and a maximum angle of 37 degrees on the
skier’s left at mid-slope. The ground cover of the west
couloir is mostly scree in the summer. Where the couloir becomes
indistinct at the top the terrain becomes gentler and rocky and
much more wind affected.
The whole area drains onto
a flat bench with some old moraine features. Below the west couloir
the moraine features created a shallow depression. This depression
acted as a terrain trap, causing the avalanche to stop very quickly
and for the deposit to pile up in the depression rather than
fan out. This, plus the size and speed of the avalanche, caused
the victims to be buried very deeply in hard packed snow. There
were no boulders or trees in the track or run out that could
cause traumatic injuries to someone caught in the flowing avalanche.
Selkirk Mountain Experience
estimates they have skied the run an average of 10 times a year
with two groups of skiers in the early season for the past 17
years. They had not skied the run this season as they had primarily
been running ski mountaineering courses to this point and prefer
to ski on glaciated terrain where possible. The say they almost
never use the run mid to late season as the access and exit from
the area is threatened by the large, steep south face of Tumbledown
Mountain. As temperatures and solar radiation effect increase
as the season progresses this becomes more and more of a hazard.
Selkirk Mountain Experience also claim they have never seen an
avalanche on the La Traviata West Couloir.
Mr STANIER states that
the groups approached the La Traviata West Couloir staying high
under the rocks to the west and climbed steeply to minimize the
number of turns necessary to reach the top. The guests were told
to spread out about five feet apart. The lead guide reached the
lower angle terrain at the top of the slope and stopped to regroup
and prepare to descend at some rocks just below the ridge. The
lead guide felt a large settlement (whumph) of the snow and felt
the energy going south. He saw some snow moving. This would have
been the first class 3 avalanche the ran down the south aspect.
A few seconds later the guests that were within his sight yelled
avalanche.
The lead guide and seven
guests were left above the fracture line. The lead guide called
the lodge to report the avalanche; they called Selkirk Mountain
Helicopters who initiated the main outside agency response. The
lead guide and the seven remaining guests skied down the slope
and began the rescue effort.
The avalanche ran in two
main waves. The second wave, in combination with the large volume
of snow, and the terrain trap at the bottom of the slope, resulted
in many deep burials.
Thirteen people were caught
in the avalanche. Two were partially buried and survived. Four
were completely buried and survived. Seven, including Vern LUNSFORD,
Craig KELLY, Naomi HEFFLER, David FINNERTY, Jean-Luc SCHWENDENER,
Dennis YATES, and Kathleen KESSLER were buried and died of asphyxiation.
Mr. STANIER describes in
detail the history of the winter snow pack in the Selkirk Mountains.
This is an important aspect of his report as climatic events
mid to late November 2002 created a weak layer in the snow pack
that remained throughout the winter. This November rain crust
layer was general and widespread throughout British Columbia
and was seen as a serious threat throughout the ski industry.
The Canadian Avalanche Association issued a Public Avalanche
Bulletin on January 17, 2003. It rated the avalanche hazard in
the North Columbia Region as Considerable in the alpine
and at tree line (Natural avalanches possible, Human triggered
avalanches possible); and Moderate below tree line (Natural
slab avalanches unlikely. Human triggered avalanches possible).
The travel advisory read: “It is important to remember that
this El Nino year is producing a complex and unusual snow pack
for the mountains of BC. Be alert for remote triggering and continue
to be vigilant about avoiding those tempting big steep alpine
faces. Any avalanche triggered on the older weaknesses may propagate
extensively into a large and dangerous avalanche event. Be aware
of how stresses penetrate deeper into the snow pack as you group
up.”
On January 21, 2003, Mr.
STANIER went to the site of the avalanche and conducted his on
site investigation. His investigation included taking measurements,
doing snow profiles, interviewing witnesses, and taking photographs.
At the high point of the groups up track he found a very weak,
shallow snow pack in the rocky wind scoured area. This high point
was very different from the mostly strong deep snow pack found
in the gully that the group was ascending. The November rain
crust was found throughout the shallow area fairly near to the
surface due to wind scouring. It is clear that the weight of
the first skiers triggered the failure here, where there was
no sufficient bridging strength in the snow pack to isolate them
from this layer. The failure propagated SE on the rain crust;
the initial avalanche released due to failure in tension where
the terrain steepened to 30 degrees.
The first avalanche was
a class 3 (Avalanches are rated on a five point scale, class
1 is small and relatively harmless to people through to class
5 which is the largest snow avalanche known with potential for
massive destruction) on a wind scoured south aspect at 2450 metres.
The fracture line was approximately 50 m wide and an average
of 50 cm deep and ran approximately 400 m. This avalanche crossed
the group’s track from earlier in the day. A second, small
class 1 avalanche then released in almost unskiable terrain at
approximately half height on the rounded ridge between the first
avalanche and the group’s ascent route. The main fatal avalanche
then released on the groups ascent route. It is not possible
to know exactly what the mechanism was that caused the second
and third avalanches to release in this case. They either releases
sympathetically by the vibration of the first avalanche, or the
failure propagated around the lower slope. The rain crust did
connect all these features so that is a possibility. The fatal
avalanche overran part of the second avalanche. Therefore, we
can only assume that the propagation spread from the second avalanche
to the group’s ascent route or that the release of the second
avalanche extended onto the ascent route and took out some of
the support for the slab above the rain crust and this caused
the failure.
The fracture line of the
fatal avalanche was at 2510 m on a 33 degree southwest-facing
slope. The area is wind scoured with a lee feature on the southeast
end. The fracture line was 65 m wide. The minimum depth of the
fracture was 63 cms at the skier’s right side. The maximum
depth was 260 cm in a lee pocket on the skier’s left side.
The average depth was 150 cm. The fracture showed clearly that
the shear failure was on the November rain crust and there was
no evidence that the failure stepped down from any upper layers.
The avalanche ran approximately 350 m.
Profiles taken at the avalanche
fracture line where the group’s track crossed it show a
very strong well-settled snow pack above the November crust.
Profiles taken near the rocks at the NW end of the fracture are
much more similar to the profiles taken in the shallow wind affected
areas near where the group triggered the original avalanche.
Probing around the area
above the fracture line showed a gradual decrease in depth and
strength as the slope becomes lower angle and wind exposed near
where the avalanche was triggered. The November rain crust was
felt in all locations while probing where the snow depth was
over 40 cm and in all the snow profiles.
CONCLUSION
British Columbia experienced
unseasonably warm weather in November 2002 with precipitation
in the form of rain falling on snow in mountainous areas. When
temperatures cooled, a significant melt-freeze crust was left
on the snow pack. This crust was present across the mountains
of Western Canada from the Coast Range to the Rockies and was
particularly pronounced in the northern Selkirk Mountains. Widespread
avalanche activity was reported in the northern Selkirk Mountains
between January 2, 2003 and January 19, 2003. Infoex subscribers
(a daily exchange of information provided by the Canadian Avalanche
Association between subscribing operations managing avalanche
hazards in Western Canada) were aware that a significant number
of skier remote triggered avalanches were occurring. This was
a strong indication that the weight of a skier could be sufficient
trigger to cause avalanches. More significantly, it shows that
the weight of a skier could trigger the failure of a snow layer
and this failure can propagate across the terrain. This information
was only available to Infoex subscribers. Selkirk Mountain Experience
did not subscribe to Infoex, the only information they had was
their own observations and the known avalanche rating of ‘Considerable’.
Professional guides must
meet certification guidelines set the the Association of Canadian
Mountain Guides. The sport of ski touring however is unregulated.
There are no guidelines to say what is an acceptable risk, how
many people should be on a slope at the same time, how many people
should be in each party, or any of the other questions which
arise after a tragic event. An individual skier can chose not
to follow his guide into an area that appears to present a level
of risk greater than that he or she is willing to accept.
Mr. LUNSFORD was a highly
skilled and experienced skier who was spending a week of guided
ski touring at Selkirk Mountain Experience. His holiday would
see him guided into some of the best ski touring terrain in the
world. He (and the other clients) would rely on the decisions
made by their guide to give them the best skiing experience possible,
balanced against their expectations and the risk involved to
meet that objective. These decisions are based on past experience
in the area; day-to-day observations of the snow conditions;
training; the ability of the client; and interpretation of snow
stability through snow profiling, probing and testing. In most
cases, the higher the skill level of the client, the more challenging
the terrain they want to ski, which leads to higher levels of
risk.
Ski touring is an inherently
dangerous sport. People who ski at this level are aware of the
risk. Release of Liability/Waiver of claims documents are routinely
signed before skiing begins.
I find that Ralph Vernon
LUNSFORD died on January 20, 2003, in the area know as La Traviata
West Couloir, approximately 25 kilometres north of Revelstoke,
British Columbia. The cause of death was determined to be Asphyxiation,
due to being buried in snow following an avalanche.
I classify this death as
accidental.
Pursuant to Section 3(2)(d)
of the Coroners Act, the following recommendations are forwarded
to the Chief Coroner of British Columbia for distribution to
the appropriate person or persons.
Dated this 23rd day of
September 2003.
Charles H. PURSE, A Coroner
In and for the Province of British Columbia.
RECOMMENDATIONS:
To:
Mr. John WILLOW
Director, Policy and Economic Development
Business Development Division
Land and Water British Columbia
PO Box 9475 Stn Prov Govt
Victoria, B.C. V8W 9W6
To:
Mr. Clair ISRAELTON
Executive Director
Canadian Avalanche Association
Box 2759
Revelstoke, B.C. V0E 2S0
BACKGROUND AND RECOMMENDATION
Wilderness adventure tourism
is one of the fastest growing sports in British Columbia. The
number of commercial ski touring lodges and hut operations has
grown with the growth in adventure tourism. Client safety is
an issue that commercial operators must deal with on a daily
basis. Guides make decisions related to client safety on a daily,
sometimes minute-to-minute basis. In order to make the correct
decision it must be an informed decision, based on as much information
as is available at the time. Commercial operators, operating
in isolation from their neighbors, limit themselves in the amount
of information at hand.
In 1991, after several
avalanche deaths in the helicopter skiing industry, the Canadian
Avalanche Association (CAA) developed a program called Infoex
after two consecutive Coroner’s recommendations. The Infoex
provides daily avalanche, snow and weather information to subscribing
members. Each subscribing member pays an annual fee and must
contribute daily avalanche, snow, and weather observations to
the CAA. This information is complied by CAA staff, analyzed,
and made available to subscribers in the form of a daily bulletin.
This information is a valuable tool for accurate avalanche forecasting.
1. It is recommended that
all commercial operations, where client safety could be affected
by avalanches, be required to participate in Infoex. Program
participation in Infoex could be a requirement of the land use
tenure.
To:
Association of Canadian
Mountain Guides
Karl KLASSEN, Executive Director
PO Box 8341
Canmore, Alberta
T1W 2V1
BACKGROUND OF THE RECOMMENDATION
As research continues the
knowledge of snow science has grown rapidly. Certified guides
must keep abreast of the latest research concerning snow science
in order to offer their clients the greatest assurance of safety.
Avalanche courses and snow seminars are offered on a regular
basis and should be attended by certified guides on a regular,
or scheduled, basis.
With the increase in the
number of commercial ski touring lodges and hut operations comes
the need for these operators to promote standards of safety,
client care and operating methods for the industry. The formation
of an association, similar to the British Columbia Helicopter
Skiing and Snowcat Operators Association, would serve the interests
of everyone involved in the ski touring industry.
2. It is recommended that
a copy of this Judgement of Inquiry be forwarded for information
purposes.
(End of report)
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